Dalai Lama letters |
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In September 1993, the Dalai Lama published a set of private letters written by him to the Chinese authorities over the previous decade. His introductory commentary to this correspondence revealed increasing frustration at the marked reluctance of Beijing to enter into serious negotiations on the future of Tibet. Representative extracts from the letters themselves are also given.
Statement by His Holiness the Dalai Lama
It is once again necessary for me to state clearly what my position is with respect to the future of Tibet. The problem of Tibet is not the question of the Dalai Lama's return and status. It is the problem of the rights and freedoms of the six million Tibetans in Tibet. I am convinced that this question can only be solved through negotiations. My position over the years has been consistent, but Chinese Government statements create confusion by suggesting that the Chinese Government is always open to negotiations but that [the] Tibetans are not.
One such statement, made by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 25 August 1993, repeats the position first conveyed to my emissary by Mr Deng Xiaoping in 1979; namely, that "except for the independence of Tibet, all other questions can be negotiated" [and] that "the door to negotiations remains wide open."
For the past 14 years, since that position was first stated, I have not only declared my willingness to enter into negotiations, but also made a series of proposals which clearly lie within the framework for negotiations proposed by Mr Deng Xiaoping. The ideas put forward during discussions my representatives held with Chinese officials in Beijing, and later made in the Five-Point Peace Plan (1987) and the Strasbourg Proposal (1988), envisage a solution which does not ask for the independence of Tibet. Yet China has refused to enter into negotiations of any kind, or otherwise to seriously discuss any of those proposals or to constructively respond to them.
I have made it clear that negotiations must centre around ways to end China's population transfer policy which threatens the survival of the Tibetan people; the respect for fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms of the Tibetans; the demilitarisation and denuclearisation of Tibet; the restoration of control to the Tibetan people of all matters affecting their own affairs; and the protection of the natural environment. I have always emphasised that any negotiations must comprise the whole of Tibet, not just the area which China calls the "Tibet Autonomous Region"
I am releasing today the text of my most recent letters and accompanying note to Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Jiang Zemin, which were delivered to them by my emissaries in Beijing in July 1993, as well as my first letter to Mr Deng Xiaoping. They show the consistency of my approach and my determined efforts to seek a peaceful, reasonable and just solution, within the framework formulated by Mr Deng Xiaoping. I have never called for negotiations on the independence of Tibet. There has been no constructive response by China to these letters.
I am deeply concerned about the Chinese Government's intentions with regard to Tibet. Official Chinese statements are aimed at confusing the real issues and delaying any substantial discussion on the problem. While repeating the position that China is prepared to negotiate, the Chinese Government continues to seek a "final solution" to the question of Tibet: the flooding of Tibet with Chinese settlers so as to entirely overpower and assimilate the Tibetan people. This concern is heightened by the revelation last week of a secret meeting held on 12 May in Sichuan, in which a dual strategy was agreed upon by the Chinese authorities in order to suppress Tibetan resistance:
1. To transfer ever larger numbers of Chinese into Tibet in order to make it demographically "impossible for the Tibetans to rise up"; and
2. To manipulate important Tibetan religious persons, to infiltrate religious institutions and to create divisions in the Tibetan movement.
If the Chinese Government is sincere about negotiating a solution to the question of Tibet, it must unequivocally reverse this decision, not only in words, but in practice. I call on the Chinese Government to start negotiations without delay and without preconditions.
Letter to Deng Xiaoping, 23 March 1981
Your Excellency:
I agree with and believe in the communist ideology which seeks the well-being of human beings in general and the proletariat in particular, and in Lenin's policy of the equality of the nationalities. Similarly, I was pleased with the discussions I had with Chairman Mao on ideology and the policy towards nationalities. If that same ideology and policy had been implemented it would have brought much admiration and happiness. However, if one is to make a general comment on the developments during the past two decades, there has been a lapse in economic and educational progress - the basis of human happiness.
To take the case of the situation in Tibet, it is regrettable that some Tibetan officials, who lack the wisdom and competence required for promoting basic human happiness and the short- and long-term welfare of their own people, indulge in flattering Chinese officials and collaborate with those Chinese officials who know nothing about Tibetans, and who work simply for their temporary fame by indulging in fabricating impressive reports. In reality, the Tibetan people have not only undergone immeasurable sufferings, but large numbers have also unnecessarily lost their lives. Besides, during the Cultural Revolution, there was immense destruction of Tibet's ancient cultural heritage. All these regrettable events present a brief impression of the past.
In early 1979, at your invitation, Gyalo Thondup visited China. Through him you had sent a message saying that we should keep in touch with each other. You had also invited us to send fact-finding delegations to Tibet. Therefore, three fact-finding delegations have been able to find out both the positive and negative aspects of the situation in Tibet. If the Tibetan people's identity is preserved and if they are genuinely happy, there is no reason to complain. However, in reality over 90% of Tibetans are suffering both mentally and physically, and are living in deep sorrow. These sad conditions have not been brought about by natural disasters, but by human actions. Therefore, genuine efforts must be made to solve the problem in accordance with the existing realities in a reasonable way.
In order to do this, we must improve the relationship between China and Tibet as well as between Tibetans inside and outside Tibet. With truth and equality as our foundation, we must try to develop friendship between Tibetans and Chinese in future through better understanding. [The] time has come to apply our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broadmindedness to achieve genuine happiness for the Tibetan people with a sense of urgency. On my part, I remain committed to contribute to the welfare of all human beings, and in particular the poor and the weak, to the best of my ability, without making any distinction based on national boundaries.
With the assurance of my highest regards and esteem.
The Dalai Lama.
Letter to Deng Xiaoping, 11 September 1992 (with a copy to Jiang Zemin)
Dear Mr Deng:
I am pleased that direct contact has once again been established between us. I hope that this will lead to an improvement of relations and the development of mutual understanding and trust.
I have been informed of the discussion Mr Ding Guangen had with Gyalo Thondup on 22 June 1992, and the position of the Government of China concerning negotiations for a solution to the Tibetan question. I am disappointed with the hard and inflexible position conveyed by Mr Ding Guangen, particularly the emphasis on preconditions for negotiations. However, I remain committed to the belief that our problems can be solved only through negotiations held in an atmosphere of sincerity and openness, for the benefit of both the Tibetan and Chinese people. To make this possible, neither side should put up obstacles, and neither side should therefore state preconditions.
For meaningful negotiations to take place it is essential to have mutual trust. Therefore, in order to create trust, I believe that it is important for the leaders and people of China to know of the endeavours I have made so far. My three representatives carry with them a letter from me, accompanied by detailed note of views and my efforts through the years to promote negotiations in the best interest of the Tibetan and Chinese people. They will answer and discuss any questions and points you wish to raise. It is my hope that through these renewed discussions we will find a way that will lead us to negotiations.
On my part, I have put forward many ideas to solve our problem. I believe that it is now time for the Chinese Government to make a genuinely meaningful proposal if you wish to see Tibet and China live together in peace. I, therefore, sincerely hope that you will respond in a spirit of openness and friendship.
Yours sincerely,
The Dalai Lama.
Note Accompanying the Letters to Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Jiang Zemin
On 22 June [1992], Mr Ding Guangen met with Mr Gyalo Thondup in Beijing, and restated the assurance given by Mr Deng Xiaoping to Mr Gyalo Thondup in 1979: that the Chinese Government was willing to discuss and resolve any issue with us except total independence. Mr Ding Guangen also said that, in the Chinese Government's view, "the Dalai Lama is continuing with independence activities," but [that] the Chinese Government was willing to immediately start negotiations as soon as I gave up the independence of Tibet. This position, repeatedly stated in the past by the Chinese Government, shows that the Chinese leadership still does not understand my ideas regarding the Tibetan-Chinese relationship. Therefore, I take this opportunity to clarify my position through this note.
It is an established fact that Tibet and China existed as separate countries in the past. The fact that the Chinese Government found it necessary to conclude a "Seventeen-Point Agreement" with the Tibetan Government in 1951 clearly shows the Chinese Government's acknowledgement of Tibet's unique position.
1. When I visited Beijing in 1954, I had the impression that most of the Communist Party leaders I met were honest, straightforward and open-minded. Chairman Mao Zedong, in particular, told me on several occasions that the Chinese were in Tibet only to help Tibet harness its natural resources and use them for the development of the country; that General Zhang Jingwu and General Fan Ming were in Tibet to help me and the people of Tibet, and not to rule the Tibetan Government and people; and that all Chinese officials in Tibet were there to help me and to be withdrawn when Tibet had progressed.
2. When the "Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee" was set up in Lhasa in 1956, there was no alternative but to work sincerely with it for the interest and benefit of both parties. However, by then the Chinese authorities had already started to use unthinkable brutal force to impose communism on the Tibetan people of the Kham and Amdo areas, particularly in Lithang. This increased the resentment of the Tibetans against Chinese politics, leading to open resistance. By then [late-1956], the situation in Tibet had become extremely dangerous and desperate. Nevertheless, I decided to return to Tibet to give the Chinese Government another opportunity to be able to implement their promises. I believe, I was once again doing my best to promote co-operation between Tibet and China.
3. However, because of the harsh military repression in the Kham and Amdo parts of eastern Tibet, thousands of young and old Tibetans began to arrive in Lhasa as refugees. This led to greater resentment and a worsening of the situation. Nevertheless, I continued to counsel my people to seek a peaceful solution and to show restraint. But the situation continued to deteriorate and finally exploded in the tragic events of 1959, which forced me to leave Tibet.
4. In spite of my unfulfilled hopes and disappointments in dealing with the Chinese Government, and since Tibet and China will always remain as neighbours, I am convinced that we must strive to find a way to co-exist in peace and help each other. This, I believe, is possible and worthy of our efforts.
5. In March 1979, Mr Deng Xiaoping invited Mr Gyalo Thondup to Beijing and told him that apart from the question of total independence, all other issues could be discussed and all problems could be resolved. This naturally gave us great hope in resolving our problem peacefully, and we started sending delegations to Tibet.
On 23 March 1981, I sent a letter to Mr Deng Xiaoping [text given above]. There was no reply to my letter. Instead, on 28 July 1981, General Secretary Hu Yaobang gave Mr Gyalo Thondup a document entitled "Five-Point Policy Towards the Dalai Lama." This was a surprise and a great disappointment. The reason for our consistent efforts to deal with the Chinese Government is to achieve lasting and genuine happiness for [the] six million Tibetans who must live as neighbours of China from generation to generation. However, the Chinese leadership chose to ignore this and, instead, attempted to reduce the whole issue to that of my personal status and the conditions of my return, without any willingness to address the real underlying issue.
6. 1983, 1984 and 1985, wherein I said the following:
"... past history has disappeared in the past. What is more relevant is that in the future there actually must be real peace and happiness through developing friendly and meaningful relations between China and Tibet. For this to be realised, it is important for both sides to work hard to have tolerant understanding and be open-minded." (1981)
"... the deprivation of freedom to express one's views, either by force or by other means, is absolutely anachronistic and a brutal form of oppression. Hence, the six million Tibetan people must have the right to preserve, and enhance their cultural destiny and manage their own affairs, and find fulfilment of their free self-expression, without interference from any quarters." (1983) "Irrespective of varying degrees of development and economic disparities, continents, nations, communities, families, in fact, all individuals, are dependent on one another for their existence and well-being. By clearly realising this, we must develop mutual compassion, love and a fundamental sense of justice. In such an atmosphere there is hope that problems between nations and problems within families can be gradually overcome and that people can live in peace and harmony." (1984)
"... in order to achieve genuine happiness in any human society, freedom of thought is extremely important. This freedom of thought can only be achieved from mutual trust, mutual understanding and the absence of fear. In the case of Tibet and China too, unless we can remove the state of mutual fear and mistrust, unless we can develop a genuine sense of friendship and goodwill, the problems that we face today will continue to exist." (1985)
In these and other ways I expressed my views clearly. But there was no reciprocity to my conciliatory approaches.
7. Since all the exchanges between [the] Tibetans and Chinese yielded no results, I felt compelled to make public my views on the steps necessary for an agreeable solution to the fundamental issues. On 21 September 1987, I announced a Five-Point Peace Plan in the United States of America. The basic elements were:
a. The transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of ahimsa (peace and non-violence);
b. The abandonment of China's population transfer policy, which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
c. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
d. The restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
e. The commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and relations between the Tibetans and the Chinese people.
8. On 15 June 1988, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, I once again elaborated on the Five-Point Peace Plan. I proposed as a framework for negotiations to secure the basic rights of the Tibetan people, China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy and maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet in defence until a regional peace conference was convened and Tibet was transformed in into a natural peace sanctuary. My idea was to make it possible for China and Tibet to stay together in lasting friendship and to secure the right for the Tibetans to govern their own country. I sincerely believe that in the future a demilitarised Tibet as a zone of ahimsa will contribute to harmony and peace not only between Tibetans and Chinese, but to all the neighbouring countries and the entire region.
9. On 23 September 1988, the Chinese Government issued a statement that China was willing to begin negotiations with us. The announcement stated that the date and venue for these negotiations would be left to the Dalai Lama. We welcomed this announcement from Beijing and responded on 25 October 1988, proposing January 1989 as the time and Geneva, an internationally recognised neutral venue, as our choices.
The Chinese Government responded on 18 November 1988, rejecting Geneva and expressing a preference for Beijing, or else Hong Kong, as the venue.
With a feasible and open attitude we accommodated the Chinese Government's requests and agreed to send representatives to Hong Kong to hold preliminary meetings with representatives of the Chinese Government. Unfortunately, when both sides had finally agreed on Hong Kong as the site for preliminary discussions, the Chinese Government refused to communicate any further and failed to live up to their own suggestion.
10. Although I championed this proposal for over two years there was no evidence of consideration or even an acknowledgement from the Chinese Government. Therefore, in a speech at Yale University on 9 October 1991, I said:
"I am considering the possibility of a visit to Tibet. I have in mind two purposes for such a visit.
First, I want to ascertain the situation in Tibet myself on the spot and communicate directly with my people. By doing so I also hope to help the Chinese leadership to understand the true feelings of [the] Tibetans.
Second, I wish to advise and persuade my people not to abandon non-violence as the appropriate form of struggle.
11. The Chinese Government has, with great doubt and suspicion, described our struggle as a movement to restore the "old society" and [said] that it was not in the interest of the Tibetan people but for the personal status of the Dalai Lama. Since my youth, I was aware of the many faults of the existing system in Tibet and wanted to improve it. At that time I started the process of reform in Tibet. Soon after our flight to India we introduced democracy in our exile community, step by step. It is impossible for Tibet to ever revert to the old system of government. Whether my efforts for the Tibetan cause are as charged by the Chinese for my personal position and benefit or not is clear from my repeated statements that in a future Tibet I will not assume any governmental responsibility or hold any political position. Furthermore, this is reflected clearly in the charter which governs the Tibetan Administration-in-Exile and in the 'Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity and the Basic Features of its Constitution', which I announced on 26 February 1992.
12. An impartial review of the above points will clearly show that my ideas and successive efforts have consistently sought solutions that will allow Tibet and China to live together in peace.
I trust in the far-sightedness and wisdom of China's leaders and hope that they will take into consideration the current global political changes and the need to resolve the Tibetan problem peacefully, promoting genuine lasting friendship between our two neighbouring peoples.
Note: In his March 10th Statement of 1994, the Dalai Lama said: "I must now recognise that my approach has failed to produce any progress either for substantive negotiations or in contributing to the overall improvement of the situation in Tibet." He went on to suggest that the failure of conciliatory advances to the Chinese authorities might force him to seek a new approach to the Tibetan struggle for freedom.