



**CHINA PLAYS
GAMES WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS**



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2001, despite having been engaged since 1998 in a sustained crackdown on fundamental human rights, Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Although the International Olympic Committee's Executive Director, Francois Carrard admitted that there had only been one issue under discussion - human rights - supporters of the bid expressed their confidence that the Games would be a 'force for good.' The IOC's new President, Jacques Rogge, said "We are convinced that the Olympic Games will improve human rights in China". (Interview on BBC Hardtalk, 24 April 2002.)

Human Rights campaigners across the globe expressed astonishment at the decision citing the current crackdown as evidence that, if China could so blatantly abuse human rights whilst it was bidding for the Games, there was no reason to suppose that the Olympics would lead to any change, unless sustained international scrutiny and pressure was instituted along with the Games.

In the 54 years since China invaded Tibet, the direct link between international scrutiny and pressure and China's willingness to take positive steps in the sphere of human rights has become transparently clear. Tibet Campaigners immediately contacted the IOC to convey this message (see Appendix 2 for full details of contact with the IOC), and to propose that the IOC institute mechanisms, including building China's support for the Olympic Truce, which would lead to progress in resolving difficult issues such as Tibet, Taiwan and freedom of expression. However as this report will demonstrate the reality, three years after Beijing was granted the Olympics, is very different.

This report, prepared by representatives of a global coalition of 100 Tibet campaign organisations called the International Tibet Support Network, is the third of its kind. Annual reports, which assessed the human rights situation in Tibet and China, and examined key issues relating to the IOC and the Olympic Games, have been produced since the decision to award the Games to Beijing in 2001. This year's report focuses on three key areas that relate to the Olympic Games and Olympic Truce:

The first of these is conflict resolution, based on China's support for the Olympic Truce and the continuing tensions over Tibet and Taiwan. (Chapter 3).

The second is freedom of expression. This relates to an apparent promise that Beijing's bid committee made in 2001 of media freedom by 2008. (Chapter 4)

The third area (Chapter 5) is the possible direct impact of the Olympic Games on China's control of dissent. Olympic Host Cities are contractually required to prevent political demonstrations, and this report looks at China's methodology in controlling its population at present.

This report concludes that the impression that the Olympics would facilitate human rights improvements has not so far borne fruit. The one promise that China properly made, that media freedom was guaranteed, was backtracked on almost immediately. In the past two years, China has engaged in a sweeping crackdown on prominent Tibetan religious leaders, and in its handling of the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June has provided further examples of the regime's inability to deal with dissent. Tibet campaigners are further concerned that the Host City contract will provide Beijing with a licence for 'zero tolerance' of dissent.

If international scrutiny and pressure is required as motivation for China to make progress, Tibet campaigners ask where that scrutiny and pressure will come from in order to fulfil the IOC's confident predictions? It does not appear to be forthcoming from the IOC itself. Indeed, recent letters to supporters of Tibet suggest that the IOC has washed its hands of human rights altogether, and is not even prepared to admit that human rights in China may be an issue. "The IOC relies on recognised and competent bodies, such as the United Nations and its system, to handle related matters and to monitor the situation in those countries and areas where such issues arise. Your concern should therefore be referred to those organisations." (Letter from IOC HQ 16 June 2004.) As will be demonstrated below, China successfully evades criticism in the annual United Nations Commission for Human Rights (see 2.2.)

In contrast to the various measures put in place to monitor environmental issues relating to the Beijing Games, the IOC has refused to appoint human rights advisers or to carry out any monitoring of the human rights situation in China. This is despite the IOC's Executive Director, Francois Carrard's admission, when he opened the press conference after Beijing's successful bid in July 2001, that human rights had been the only issue under discussion relating to Beijing's bid.

Tibet campaigners remain opposed to China hosting the Olympic Games: the same regime that brutally oppresses the people in occupied Tibet and is responsible for executions and continued human rights violations in China, has been given by the IOC a huge opportunity to showcase themselves as respectable political leaders. Tibetans and their supporters oppose the 2008 Games in Beijing and say "no" to this lie.

The International Tibet Support Network calls on the IOC to, in the spirit of the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Truce Resolution adopted by the 54th UN General Assembly on 24 November 1999, press for peaceful, unconditional negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and China on the future of Tibet.

The IOC should further establish benchmarks to determine the basis for an eventual reconsideration of the location of the 2008 Olympics in the event of a lack of improvement or further deterioration of the human rights situation in China and Tibet.

There should be no Olympics in China until Tibet is free.

2. INTRODUCTION

China's standing in the international community continues to grow in influence. It is a truly remarkable country, with a long history and rich culture, but the ruling Communist Party has a reputation as an abuser of fundamental human rights, built on its brutal treatment of the Tibetan people over the past half century, and its bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

When China first bid for the Olympics (the 2000 Games) memories of Tiananmen Square were painfully fresh. Even the unsqueamish IOC was not prepared to reward China with such an internationally prestigious event, but assurances were quietly given that a future bid may prove successful. In 2001, despite being engaged in a sustained crackdown on pro-democracy activists and nationalism in Tibet, China was granted the 2008 Olympic Games. Supporters of Beijing's bid made much of the prospect that the Games would be a 'force for good'.

2.1. The potential - The Olympics as a force for good in China.

"Some people say, because of serious human rights issues, 'We close the door and say no.' The other way is to bet on openness. Bet on the fact that in the coming seven years, openness, progress and development in many areas will be such that the situation will be improved. We are taking the bet that seven years from now we will see many changes." Francois Carrard, Executive Director of the IOC, 13 July 2001.

China initially appeared to be willing to introduce changes which would meet with international approval. Wang Wei, Secretary General of the Beijing bid committee said on 13 July 2001: "We will give the media complete freedom to report when they come to China. We are confident that the Games coming to China not only promotes our economy but also enhances all social conditions, including education, health, and human rights." (see 4.1. for more on media freedom.) In response to questions from foreign journalists, officials in Beijing also echoed Wang's tune. "With the approach of the 2008 Olympic Games, we will intensify our efforts (to protect human rights)," Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan, 25 April 2002.

Although this report deals exclusively with human rights, substantial economic gains are clearly the main benefit that China and Olympic Sponsors are expecting will result from the Games. However the example of the importance given to environmental issues demonstrates well the degree of influence the IOC can wield when it

chooses on the Host City. The IOC has environmental consultants as part of its Coordination Commission working closely with the Beijing Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) to help them fulfil their promises. The issue of the environment could provide a positive lesson to the Chinese leadership of the importance of living up to international standards. Without that international scrutiny, it is highly unlikely that China's leaders would recognise the importance of improving the quality of the environment for its people in deference to economic or political considerations.

Corruption is a further area where the Olympics could benefit China. The leadership has its own reasons for wanting to deal with corruption, since it is an issue that could lead to unrest. Corruption tends to occur when there is no transparency or little accountability thus allowing a climate of impunity to develop, but China seems to be making efforts to control it. In his June 2004 report, Li Jinhua, auditor-general, documented that Chinese officials in the General Administration of Sports Department spent £8.7 million of Olympic funding intended to build facilities for young athletes on building apartments for party officials, or invested in associated companies or bonuses to workers. In addition, financial misconduct was also found in 41 out of 55 government departments investigated.

2.2. The Reality – China and International Pressure.

"To be frank, only the international community is supervising China, it's hard to supervise the Communist Party," Economist Mao Yushi, commenting on the revelations of widespread corruption among Government and Party officials, 26 June 2004, Australian Broadcast Company.

In July 2001, just over a week after the decision, Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing made a direct link between Beijing's success in being granted the 2008 Olympics and the regime's brutal crackdown on Falun Gong, reinforcing the fears of Tibet campaigners that China would take Beijing's success as an endorsement of the regime. "We have won a great victory against Falun Gong....we have won the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games" (reported by The Australian, 23 July 2001).

Later that year, the US State Department's Annual Report linked China's growing influence in the international community and human rights. "The Chinese leadership's preoccupation with stability in the face of continued economic and social upheaval fuelled an increase in human rights violations. China's increasingly prominent international profile, symbolised in 2001 by its entry into the World Trade Organisation and by Beijing's successful bid to host the 2008 Olympics, was accompanied by tightened controls on fundamental freedoms." (2001 Country Reports.)

In recent years, China has successfully muted international criticism of human rights through a combination of diplomatic manoeuvring and threats of economic action against its critics. Since the late 1990s, up to a dozen nations and bodies, including the European Union, have been engaged in bilateral dialogues with China on human rights. Since the consolidation of these dialogues, the number of countries prepared to support a resolution condemning China for its human rights abuses at the annual United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) has plummeted. Denmark, which tabled a resolution on China at 1997's UNCHR, suffered punitive economic action by China. In 2004, the United States concluded that its dialogue with China on human rights was failing to produce results, and tabled a resolution at UNCHR. In response China angrily suspended the dialogue. Since former President Clinton delinked China's renewal of 'Most Favoured Nation' trading status from human rights improvements in 1994, following which China embarked on its most serious crackdown since 1989, no nation or body has applied consistent robust pressure on China to progress human rights.

"The power struggle has created a policymaking dynamic favouring hard-line extremism as the politically 'safe' direction. But it is the wrong one. Just ask the relatives of the hundreds of people who died of SARS in 11 countries because China did not face up to the crisis when it first broke out." (Editorial, Washington Post 8 July 2004.)

In the period since the Games were awarded to Beijing, there has been a change in leadership in China. In March 2003, Hu Jintao assumed the position of President of China from his predecessor Jiang Zemin; the first apparently smooth transition of power in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. However in recent months,

reports in the international press of a power struggle between former President Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have been intensifying, relating to sensitive issues such as Taiwan (see page 9). Jiang Zemin retains the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission and a considerable degree of influence within the Communist Party; he appears to be resisting pressure to retire, although a number of generals have apparently urged him to do so, aware of the damage that having 'two centres' of power could cause the Party.

The net result of this power struggle is a hardening of policy, as both camps seek to demonstrate they are 'tough enough' to govern. "Policy is being used as a weapon in the power struggle. Under these conditions, no one wants to be soft. Everyone wants to be tougher." (Government source quoted by Washington Post, 31 May 2004.)

2.3. The Reality – The IOC's attitude to Human Rights.

"It is not the task of the IOC to get involved in monitoring or lobbying or influencing...Of course we are totally in favour of the human rights. The better they are, the better we would be pleased. But the IOC is not a political body, the IOC is a sports body." (IOC President Jacques Rogge, 27 August 2001, quoted by AFP).

"If we are not satisfied with any of the aspects, be it transport, pollution, security, we will act and that means we will take corrective measures, but don't ask me to tell you what we will do because I don't know what is going to happen....This is purely speculative... let the case come up first and we'll see what the best action is, but I never, never said that we will withdraw the Games. That is absolutely stupid." (Jacques Rogge, 26 May 2002, quoted by AFP.)

Given the current world security situation it is perhaps not unsurprising that the IOC has taken out an insurance policy for the Athens Games, in what its President Jacques Rogge termed "standard and prudent behaviour" to the tune of US \$170 million. The intention is to do similarly for all summer and winter games until 2012. This is part of the IOC's new policy to put in place a risk assessment strategy in place for the Games. The question for human rights organisations and the people of Tibet and China is are there provisions which will restrict their civil liberties? What is the risk to the IOC's reputation if there are human rights abuses associated with the Games? Examples of China's own "insurance tactics" came on 3 May 2002 when it was reported that China had allegedly given police in Jilin Province the go-ahead to arrest Falun Gong members without warrants until the end of 2007 as part of the 2008 Olympic crackdown. (Reuters, 3 May 2002.)

3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

"Would China invade Taiwan? Retired Chinese generals have urged military action well ahead of 2008 Olympics." Headline in Christian Science Monitor, 22 July 2004.

3.1. The Potential – China and the Olympic Truce:

The sacred Greek tradition of Ekecheiria, under which hostilities between nations were suspended in favour of competition in the Games, was observed for 12 centuries. The modern Games were established in 1896, but two world wars and conflicts that affected sport, such as Russia's invasion of Afghanistan prior to the 1980 Olympics (see below), prompted the IOC in 1992 to revive the tradition and call upon the international community to observe an Olympic Truce. In 1998, during the Nagano Winter Olympics, the Truce apparently offered UN Secretary General Kofi Annan an opportunity to intervene to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Iraq (see www.olympictruce.org).

In November 1999, in the run up to the Sydney Olympic Games, 180 UN member states signed a resolution which urged all nations to "abide by the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, and to pursue, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts through diplomatic solutions". China was a signatory to this resolution.

In September 2000, a letter from Chinese President Jiang Zemin was presented to IOC President Juan Samaranch, expressing China's support for the Olympic Truce, "China has all along stood for the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. I very much appreciate your personal and IOC's positive efforts in promoting world peace. China supported the UN General Assembly in its adoption of the resolution on the Olympic Truce, and will, as always, endorse the spirit of Olympic Truce. I sincerely hope that all the countries and regions in conflict can observe the Olympic Truce and will seek at all times to resolve international disputes through dialogue, consultation and other peaceful means, and work together for an enduring world peace."

Clearly the values promoted by the Olympic Truce could be of benefit in peacefully resolving long-standing issues, particularly China's occupation of Tibet and the conflict with Taiwan. China has always claimed that these are 'internal' issues, but both attract widespread international concern. Ironically, in 1980 China boycotted the Moscow Olympic Games, in protest at Russia's 1979 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. In a close parallel to the views of Tibet campaigners in the present day, China said that Moscow's Games ran "counter to the spirit of the Olympics and would be used by the Soviet authorities as an endorsement of their foreign policy." (9 February 1980, Xinhua.)

3.2. The Reality – China's Occupation of Tibet.

Tibet was invaded by 40,000 Chinese troops in 1950. In 1959 following the Tibetan National Uprising, when approximately 87,000 Tibetans were killed, over 100,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile. Key developments since July 2001 are:

- **Control of Dissent:** Since September 2001, there has been a further deterioration in human rights in Tibet as China attempted to use the global 'war against terror' to target those peaceful individuals and groups it perceived to be a threat to its legitimacy and grip on power. (see 5.3 for changes to Chinese law which support this.) One of the starkest examples of this in Tibet is the case of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, a respected religious leader from Kham, now part of Sichuan province. Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche was arrested in April 2002, accused of being involved in "causing explosions" and being engaged in "splittist activities." He was sentenced to death in December 2002 with a two-year suspension. His co-accused, Lobsang Dhondup, who had withdrawn his 'confession' alleging torture, was executed in January 2003. Neither the original trial or appeal of both men conformed to international fair trial standards, and the cases attracted international criticism. In total, 60 Tibetans were held for periods ranging from a few days to a year. A further 60 were questioned and 100 fled the region. Of Rinpoche's most prominent supporters detained, five men were released early or on completion of their sentencing following international pressure. Another two men are serving seven and five year prison sentences for their support of Rinpoche.
- **Religious freedom:** Since the turn of the century, other religious leaders have been detained and residents of religious institutes such as Serthar and Larung Gar have been expelled and seen their swellings demolished. The Chinese regime continues to control freedom of religion through a 'Patriotic Education' campaign. Photographs of the Dalai Lama cannot be displayed. Possession of the Tibetan flag or shouting 'Free Tibet' is illegal and will result in arrest and imprisonment.
- **Political Imprisonment:** There remain at least 145 political prisoners in Tibet with torture, ill-treatment and sentence extensions commonplace (source: Tibet Information Network, TIN), despite China recently making several high profile early releases of Tibetans, as a way of currying favour prior to important summits and international meetings. Incidences of death in or as a result of custody are high. Female political prisoners have a 1 in 24 chance of dying before completing their sentences. (TIN.)
- **Torture** remains endemic in Chinese and Tibetan prisons as well as detention centres, despite international law's absolute prohibition of it. A visit by the UN's Special Rapporteur on Torture scheduled for June 2004 was postponed at the last minute when China cited the need for additional time to prepare. The visit had been in negotiation for many years as China had previously refused to guarantee that there would be no reprisals for those who dared to talk frankly to the UN's representative.

- **Refugees:** China broke the spirit and law of the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees by forcibly deported 18 Tibetans from Nepal in May 2003. Between 1,500 and 3,000 Tibetans flee to India each year to escape repression in Tibet.
- **Population transfer:** China is exploiting Tibet's natural resources of gas, oil and mineral deposits and building a railway to Lhasa. All these contribute to the influx of Chinese workers to Tibet and serve as a means of consolidating political control over Tibet.

For many years the 14th Dalai Lama has endeavoured to resolve the occupation of Tibet through his 'Middle Way' approach, which would allow for Tibet to be accorded 'genuine autonomy.' He has called on China to engage in unconditional negotiations with his representatives. His efforts were rebuffed for extended periods but after a decade of stalemate China has made some move towards negotiations. China's then President Jiang Zemin appeared to have developed a personal interest in Tibet, and his wife is a follower of Buddhism.

Formal contact between the Beijing and the Dalai Lama re-opened in 2002. Two visits took place in September 2002 and in May and June 2003 but at the time of writing a third visit has yet to take place, although one has been mooted for October. This delay has prompted fears that the momentum may have slowed once more, and that power struggles in Beijing may lead to a hardening of policy. China's publication in May 2004 of a combative White Paper on Tibet, which attacked the Dalai Lama's claim for 'autonomy' has reinforced these fears. (see below). Observers have also watched keenly to see how Tibet policy would evolve once the Presidency of the People's Republic of China passed to Hu Jintao in March 2003.

Optimistic assessments of the impact of this leadership change on China's Tibet policy pointed to Hu Jintao's intimate knowledge of Tibet, due to his former role as the TAR's Party Secretary in the late 1980s. In fact Hu spent very little of his tenure actually in Tibet, preferring to oversee events from Beijing. Tibetans regard him as a hardliner; not only did he implement martial law in March 1989, but he was the architect of strategies which saw increased control of religious and cultural affairs and the use of economic development as a tool in the "struggle against separatism". Both of these policies are visible in Tibet to this day. Statements made by Hu during his period as Party Secretary reveal a deep distrust of the Tibetan people.

In May 2004, just as optimism was growing that a further visit by envoys of the Dalai Lama to Beijing may be imminent, China published a White Paper on Tibet. This attacks the Dalai Lama's efforts to promote genuine autonomy for Tibet, and rules out any approach based on Hong Kong's "one country two systems". Release of the paper suggests that China recognises both the success the Dalai Lama has had in promoting his message and the failure of its own propaganda campaign on Tibet in influencing the international community. The White Paper's heavy emphasis on China's concept of 'autonomy' could be interpreted as China's recognition that the Dalai Lama's claim to have totally renounced independence for Tibet has been accepted by western leaders.

As the future of formal contact on Tibet remains in the balance, optimists point to the process having survived a change in China's leadership, but more cynical observers claim that China has used both previous visits strategically to deflect potential criticism. China may well choose to pursue this strategy again, as the spotlight of the world turns to Beijing with the passing of the Olympic flag. Without pressure, the Chinese regime will refuse to change or even engage in the process. One such example came in July 2003, the 'deadline' for a resolution passed by the European Parliament in 2000, which stated that if no progress had been made in negotiations in three years, that EU member states should consider formally recognising the Tibetan Government in exile. Although the resolution could not be enforced by the Parliament, it had served as a means to raise the profile of the issue internationally.

International pressure remains crucial if there is to be progress on Tibet. Personal requests in the late 1990s, made by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President Bill Clinton to then Chinese President Jiang Zemin, to start talks with the Dalai Lama were raised by Jiang Zemin with Politburo colleagues, indicating that such requests were regarded as significant. There is no information available about what representations the IOC has made concerning the resolution of the occupation of Tibet.

3.3. The Reality - Taiwan.

Tensions over Taiwan have escalated since Chen Shui-bian was re-elected in March 2004. This, his second term of office, will end in 2008 - the year that Beijing will host the Olympic Games, and Beijing is closely watching what moves Chen may make towards independence during this period.

As the People's Liberation Army's executed its annual military manoeuvres in late July 2004, the "will they, won't they invade?" debate rumbled on. Chinese state media took the unusual step of publicising this year's exercises, which were in the form of a mock invasion of Taiwan. China carried out coordinated air, sea and ground attacks on Dongshan, an island in the South China Sea that resembles Taiwan in terrain and weather. Jiang Zemin was reported recently to have told military leaders that China should take steps to recover Taiwan by the year 2020, but experts see that China will have the technical ability to take this step much sooner. Reports have emerged which suggest that generals have pointed out the advantages of moving swiftly, so that the expected international condemnation would have time to die down before the Beijing Olympic Games. An article by Robert Marquand in The Christian Science Monitor on 22 July 2004 is one such report, and whilst Marquand's article points out the many reasons why an attack may not be likely, Beijing's internal political dynamic, as reported above, has certainly boosted the possibility.

4 . FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

4.1. The Potential – Media Freedom by 2008.

Following's Beijing's victory in winning the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, both the Beijing team and the IOC made reassuring noises about media freedom being guaranteed. Wang Wei, the Secretary General of the Beijing winning bid said that "the world's media will enjoy full freedom to report on all aspects of China if the 2008 Olympic Games is held in the city." (China Daily, July 2001). Jacques Rogge echoed this the following month, "Beijing has signed a Host City contract with the IOC which provides the condition on the Organising Committee to give free access to the country for all accredited media." (27 August, AP)

Freedom of expression is a fundamental part of any well-functioning society. A free press is one of the most effective mediums for allowing debate to take place, for problems to be aired and for solutions to myriad problems to be considered. In China however, freedom of expression and freedom of the press are all subjugated to the needs of the Communist Party and its continuing hold over the country's 1.3 billion population. A recent example of China's inability to deal with the truth, was its handling of a compendium of facts on the summer Olympics by a journalist called David Wallechinsky in 2004. Wallechinsky's book was completed and due to be translated into Chinese until the censor objected to several passages relating to doping and Chinese athletes and human rights concerns.

Part of China's sophisticated campaign to win the Games involved turning the human rights argument on its head by suggesting that the Olympics would act as an incentive for human rights improvements, but Tibet campaigners have valid concerns that it may act as a further incentive for crackdowns, as demonstrated by the Chinese leadership's handling of the SARS crisis (see 4.3. below).

4.2. The Reality – Media Freedom to date:

As documented in Free Tibet Campaign's 2002 Olympics report 'The IOC and China: Taking A Bet on the Olympic Ideal' the Chinese authorities very quickly demonstrated their lack of respect for media freedom and sought to restrict their promise of media freedom to the sports arena.

In a radio interview with the Australian press on 13 July 2002, China's most senior Olympic official, He Zhenliang stated that the thousands of foreign journalists will only be allowed to report the sport.

HE ZHENLIANG: I think you are reporting about the Olympics, yes? Olympics is dealing with sport, dealing with the well-being of people, yes.

ERIC CAMPBELL: So journalists won't be able to do other stories about people who disagree with the Government?

HE ZHENLIANG: Look, if you are accredited as a sports journalist, you will be allowed to cover all the kind of related to Olympics. That's our promise.

ERIC CAMPBELL: But nothing else?

HE ZHENLIANG: That's all.

ERIC CAMPBELL: What this means is that anything the Government regards as unrelated to sport; such as protests, politics or human rights issues; will be off-limits."

In 2003, ABC also reported that Beijing had already produced detailed guidance in dealing with the media to police and volunteers working at the Olympic Games. The following is an extract from PM - 8 September, 2003. Reporter JOHN TAYLOR: 'Olympic Security English' is a self-described book for police officers and volunteers. It's designed for people who will be directly or indirectly involved in security and service work at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. It was edited by a committee of senior public officers in China, including the Vice Minister of the Public Security Bureau. Much of the book consists of useful drills for various situations officers may need to speak English in, like giving directions, greetings, and answering public enquiries. But accidentally, the book is also revealing as to what other things authorities believe police will need to say and do in 2008. The very first chapter, titled 'Everyday English', contains a dialogue on how to stop illegal news coverage. (Enactment of excerpt from book)

POLICE: Excuse me, sir. Stop, please. REPORTER: Why?

POLICE: Are you gathering news here? REPORTER: Yes.

POLICE: About what? REPORTER: About Falun Gong.

POLICE: Show me your press card and reporter's permit. REPORTER: Here you are.

POLICE: What news are you permitted to cover? REPORTER: The Olympic Games.

POLICE: But Falun Gong has nothing to do with the Games. REPORTER: What does that matter?

POLICE: It's beyond the permit. REPORTER: What permit?

POLICE: You're a sports reporter. You should only cover the Games. REPORTER: But I'm interested in Falun Gong.

POLICE: It's beyond the limit of your coverage, and illegal. As a foreign reporter in China, you should obey China law and do nothing against our status.

4.3. The Reality – Media Freedom and SARS

" China's handling of the outbreak, particularly the cover up, has led to widespread concern over its ability to handle another possible disease epidemic in the months ahead of and during the 2008 Olympic Games" (AFP, 21 May 2003.)

"SARS has been the most visible expression of the cost of a lack of freedom of expression and its consequences. Already China has been under fierce criticism, first for covering up the SARS outbreak, then for underplaying it. As the virus spread to other countries, there was growing anger over the secrecy and the slowness to co-operate with the World Health Organisation. Failure to contain SARS in Beijing has tarnished its successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games" (Financial Times Leader, 23 April 2003).

SARS provided the most telling demonstration to the IOC since 2001 of the price that could be paid by entrusting the Olympic Games to an unaccountable regime. The IOC was clearly aware of the impact of SARS on preparations for the 2008 Games and significantly published its letter to the Beijing leadership which said, "the IOC is paying great attention to the updates regarding this epidemic" (AFP, 21 May 2003). In June 2003, IOC President Jacques Rogge met the new Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Lausanne; presumably China's handling of SARS was discussed.

The SARS epidemic became one of the first tests for Hu Jintao and his Premier Wen Jiabao. In the run up to the Party Congress in March 2003, during which both men would be appointed, a "good news" edict was imposed which restricted reporting on SARS. However, this news blackout allowed SARS to reach Beijing, with a case even happening within the top leadership's guarded compound. The US Congressional Executive Committee on China pointed out the link between a denial of freedom of expression facilitating the spread of this deadly disease in its 7 May 2003 report. The Guardian documented how one poor elderly lady who died may have been saved if she or her doctors had had access to the information via the internet, read English or listened to the rumours

circulating that there was a deadly virus called SARS in existence.

The global spread of SARS, with 812 deaths and over 8,000 people infected worldwide, was that it could have been prevented if not for the Chinese authority's propensity for covering up bad news for fear of embarrassment. Two cover-ups were launched to hide first the emergence of the disease in Guangdong Province and then its move into epidemic proportions. Beijing journalist Lei Xiong wrote "SARS has shattered the philosophy among some bureaucrats that silence on negative things might sustain their power" (quoted by The Guardian 9 June 2003).

The courage of those Chinese journalists and scientists who helped to expose SARS cannot be underestimated. One of the most prominent heroes was Dr Jiang Yanyong, a retired surgeon, whose open letter to the press propelled him to uncomfortable notoriety with the leadership. The global attention drawn by SARS probably saved him from punishment, but his continued outspokenness, in June 2004 on Tiananmen Square, resulted in his arrest. (see 5.2 below). The repercussions of the media's handling of the SARS crisis continued to reverberate in 2004 with the sentencing in March of the manager and an editor of an outspoken paper instrumental in talking about the SARS crisis. They had been arrested in 2003 and sentenced to 12 and 11 years on charges of corruption. Many commentators believed that they were targeted because they dared to step out of line and publish stories on SARS and workers rights. (Reuters, 22 March 2004).

4.4. The Reality –Big Brother Is Watching; Internet and SMS:

" The Chinese authorities use a clever mix of propaganda, disinformation and repression to stifle online free expression." (Reporters Sans Frontieres, [RSF] Internet Under Surveillance 2004.)

"China has developed the largest and most sophisticated IP-blocking and content-filtering system in the world" - Bill Xia, President of Asheville, North Carolina based Dynamic Internet Technology (Wired News, 5 November 2002.)

China is set to become the world's biggest user of the internet with 100 million users forecast for 2005. Correspondingly the Chinese authorities are intent on controlling its citizens access to it by employing around 30,000 internet 'police'. To help with this task it has invested in some of the most advanced technology from US companies. The range of controls are staggering:

- Compulsory registration for internet café users (foreigners will have to log in with their passport details);
- Blocking access to foreign sites such as the BBC, Amnesty International, Free Tibet Campaign, and many others;
- Installation of software to monitor key words and transmit details of the user to the authorities in chat rooms. Banned words include human rights, Taiwan independence, pornography, oral sex, SARS, the BBC and the banned Falun Gong Movement. (BBC News, Chinese censor online Chat, 19 May 2003).
- A "self discipline" pact for net service firms that puts the onus on them to act as censors and remove messages on banned subjects (June 2004). Sadly, Yahoo! capitulated to this pact to promote its business interests.
- New Chinese website that invites people to report on people using it for "illegal or unhealthy information" on the internet (May 2004)

As of May 2004, there were at least 61 cyber-dissident imprisoned in China. Once again, China has the distinction of imprisoning more people in this category than any other country. (Source: RSF)

In 2003, 220 billion text messages were sent in China, which constitutes more than half of all messages sent in the world according to Xinhua news agency. The Washington Post reported on 2 July 2004 that China was expanding its censorship controls to mobile phone text messages. In large part, the use of SMS allowed people to spread the news of the SARS despite the best efforts of the authorities to prevent all news from leaking out. At its highest point in May 2003 there were 2,800 surveillance centres according to RSF, monitoring texts on this subject in an effort to stop all information spreading.

5. CONTROL OF DISSENT

"We should remember that the system we live in is full of barbarism, inhumanity and hypocrisy. It remains a system in which freedom and democracy are smothered, in which any sparks of civilization must be extinguished, and in which any who challenge this system must be ruthlessly suppressed." (Ding Zilin, Tiananmen Square Mother, quoted in Taipei Times 3 June 2004)

5.1. The Potential – Zero Tolerance.

The Olympics Charter calls for the promotion of a "peaceful society". On the basis of recent experience, the Chinese regime seems likely to interpret a "peaceful Olympics" as being a silent Olympics, with all public dissent ruthlessly suppressed.

Tibet campaigners are concerned that the IOC has already provided the Beijing authorities with a licence for "zero tolerance" in its provision within the Olympic Charter that there should be no demonstrations or political meetings during the Olympic Games. (See http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/ocog/index_uk.asp).

Indeed, even the much fêted Sydney Games instituted legislation to limit civil freedom during the Games. Of the Sydney Games, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre said, "The Olympics Security Legislation creates a raft of new public order offences in the geographic areas in which it operates and grants broad powers to officials and police officers. While there is a need to ensure the security of all those involved with the Olympic Games, the Olympics Security Legislation goes further than what is required. The civil liberties of Sydneysiders and their security have been disregarded. No safeguards have been provided to ensure that the powers given to officers are not abused." (Olympics Liberty and Security Issues, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, February 2000.)

Clearly, for a democratic government to institute restrictions on civil liberties is controversial; the problem in China's case is that this is likely to further exacerbate an already highly restrictive regime. Tibet campaigners are however encouraged by reports that protest zones will be set aside for protestors in Greece (Washington Times, 9 June 2004.)

The question for Beijing 2008 is what would be the response if China's leadership felt under threat internally in the run-up to the Olympics? Could there be a widespread round up of any human rights activists between now and 2008? And would the IOC stand by and watch it happen? As documented above, China regards political dissent as the serious crime of "endangering state security." The Dui Hua Foundation reported that the 2003 Law Yearbook of China shows a rate of conviction of all crimes of nearly 98%. 52% of those convicted for "endangering state security" were sent to prison for longer than five years or sentenced to death. This severity of sentence is handed down to only a third of individuals convicted for "Infringing on citizens rights", which include crimes such as murder, rape and kidnapping.

One of the most interesting things revealed in a BBC Hard Talk interview with Dr Rogge was when questioned he assured the BBC's Tim Sebastian that there were provisions within the Host City contract to guarantee human rights: "we have in the host city contract a lot of provisions where we have to approve and we have to sign and we have to take decisions" (BBC Hard Talk interview, 24 April 2002). During a meeting with the IOC President on 25 October 2002 representatives of the International Tibet Support Network pressed him for access to the Host City Contract, or at the very least to reveal what human rights provisions were contained within the Contract. A claim of commercial confidentiality was used to reject these requests.

5.2 The Reality – China's handling of the 15th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square.

"Now 15 years have gone by and the authorities are expecting the people to forget the incident gradually. In the past they called this Tiananmen incident a 'counterrevolutionary rebellion', and then they called it the '1989 political storm.' Giving the incident a different name specifically indicates the perpetrators' guilty conscience. If it was a storm, why did they have to mobilize hundreds of

thousands of troops to suppress it? Why should they use machine guns and tanks to kill innocent ordinary people?" - extract from Dr Jiang Yanyong's letter, February 2004.

China's handling of the sensitive 15th anniversary of Tiananmen Square demonstrated how the current leadership power struggle had resulted in tough measures. Several prominent activists were placed under house arrest or detained. These included Dr Jiang Yanyong, the "good doctor" who did the most to break official silence around the SARS crisis in China in 2003. In February 2004, he took the brave step again of sending an open letter in advance of the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square events calling for a re-assessment of the events of June 1989. He had been an army surgeon and had treated many of the wounded from Tiananmen Square and borne witness to the large numbers of dead. Human rights activist Hu Jia stated that Dr Jiang's open letter was so powerful because "He has so much credibility. He was a doctor in 1989 and saw 80 people who died. When he spoke out, the government could no longer deny what happened." (quoted by CNN 20 July 2004.)

Dr Jiang and his wife were detained on 1 June in advance of the 4 June anniversary and he was held for seven weeks during which he underwent intense "political re-education" sessions before being released on 20 July 2004. It has been reported that he is under strict instructions not to talk to the press, although the BBC commented, "Mainland media did not report Jiang's letter, but in a country that doesn't allow public debate, a single dissenting voice can be enormously threatening. In their efforts to silence him, Jiang's captors have not mistreated him physically, but it has been a harrowing experience psychologically."

5.3. The Reality - Human rights developments since July 2001

"Despite a few positive steps, no attempt was made to introduce the fundamental legal and institutional reforms necessary to bring an end to serious human rights violations. Tens of thousands of people continued to be detained or imprisoned in violation of their rights to freedom of expression and association, and were at serious risk of torture or ill-treatment." (Amnesty International's 2004 Human Rights report on China.)

A Summary of Human Rights concerns since 2001 not covered elsewhere in this report is as follows:

- Thousands of political prisoners in China and Tibet. Torture and ill-treatment commonplace in prisons. Death in detention not uncommon.
- 'Rule of law' still a whim of the Communist Party machine.
- Strict controls on freedom of expression, conscience, religion or association.
- Intensification of crackdown on East Turkestan's (Xinjiang) ethnic Uighurs since September 11 events in the USA. An amendment to China's Criminal law adopted in December 2001 increased punishment for people "who organise or lead a terrorist organisation" from three to ten years imprisonment to between ten years and life imprisonment (Article 120 of the Criminal law). The term "terrorist organisation" is not defined in the law and could be interpreted to cover religious or other group activities that the authorities could deem to be in opposition of the state.
- Continuing crackdown on Falun Gong, other spiritual movements and religious activities outside the official churches.
- Labour activists, dissidents, academics and journalists singled out for repression.
- Extensive use of the death penalty. 69% of so-called 'capital crimes' are for non-violent offences and can extend to such loosely worded crimes as "endangering state security", "splitting the state" or "undermining national unity" (Article 103) and "supplying state secrets or intelligence overseas" (Article 111). The latter article has been used to refer to passing information to foreign journalists. Although the Chinese State deems the number of state executions to be a secret, Amnesty International have estimated the following:
2001 - By the end of the year, with the limited records available, AI had recorded 4,015 death sentences and 2,468 executions.
2002 - 1,060 executions in China in 2002.
2003 - Amnesty International had recorded 1,639 death sentences and 726 executions, although the true figures were believed to be much higher.
On 15 March 2004, a senior national legislative delegate from Chongqing Municipality stated that " China executes 'nearly 10,000' people every year" (source: Amnesty International).

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations, made to the IOC in December 2001 by members of the International Tibet Support Network, remain valid.

- In the spirit of the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Truce Resolution adopted by the 54th UN General Assembly on 24 November 1999, the IOC should use the Olympic Games to press for peaceful, unconditional negotiations on the future of Tibet between representatives of the Dalai Lama and China. (The 1999 UN resolution, co-sponsored by 180 member states, including the People's Republic of China, urges member states to "abide by the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, and to pursue, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the peaceful settlement of all international conflict through diplomatic solutions".)
- That benchmarks be set by the IOC to determine the basis for an eventual reconsideration of the location of the 2008 Olympics in the event of a lack of improvement or further deterioration of the human rights situation in China and Tibet.
- That a written guarantee be sought from the Chinese authorities stipulating that Chinese citizens and Tibetans will not be arrested for voicing dissent or any other public opinions about the Olympic Games in the run-up to, during and in the aftermath of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.
- That representations be made demanding the immediate release of those Chinese citizens already arrested for actions related to the Beijing bid.
- That a written guarantee be sought from the Chinese authorities stipulating that the local and international media will have full and free access to China and Tibet in the run-up to and during the Olympic Games. Wang Wei, Secretary-General of the Beijing bid committee, was quoted in the China Daily in July 2001 as stating that "the world's media will enjoy full freedom to report on all aspects of China if the 2008 Olympic Games is held in the city".
- That sports stadiums where ritual public humiliation and executions of alleged criminals have taken place be ruled out of the site plans for the Beijing Olympic Games.
- That a code of conduct be drawn up to guide IOC members, officials and sponsors in their role in the period running up to the Games and during the Games to prevent the IOC becoming a propaganda pawn for the Chinese authorities.
- That a mechanism for raising human rights abuses carried out by the Chinese authorities explicitly in the name of providing a "better Olympics" be established. These abuses may include arrests, detentions, torture or ill-treatment of those protesting about Beijing's preparations for the Games; coercion in Tibet or China in order to promote the Olympic Games; security crackdowns in Tibet in the name of security and "fighting terrorism".
- That a mechanism for regular consultation and a channel of communication with human rights advisers and NGOs, including the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN), be established, that enables the IOC to keep itself up-to-date with human rights violations in Tibet and China.
- That the case of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama of Tibet, be taken up by the IOC with the Chinese authorities. The Panchen Lama, one of the most senior figures in Tibetan Buddhism, was last seen in public in 1995. Despite repeated calls from the UN and governments around the world for information on his whereabouts and condition, the Chinese authorities have so far failed to respond. The case of the Panchen Lama is one of the central issues of the Tibet-China conflict.

Appendix 1 - A Brief Dark history of the Olympic Games

The Olympics Charter calls for the promotion of a "peaceful society". On the basis of recent experience, the Chinese regime seems likely to interpret a "peaceful Olympics" as being a silent Olympics, with all public dissent ruthlessly suppressed.

The IOC has already provided the Beijing authorities with a licence for "zero tolerance" in its provision within the Olympic Charter that there should be no demonstrations or political meetings during the Olympic Games (http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/ocog/index_uk.asp).

What would be the response if China's leadership felt under threat internally in the run-up to the Olympics? And would the IOC stand by and watch it happen?

Summer Games since 1936

Berlin 1936	London 1948	Helsinki 1952
Melbourne 1956	Rome 1960	Tokyo 1964
Mexico City 1968	Munich 1972	Montreal 1976
Moscow 1980	Los Angeles 1984	Seoul 1988
Barcelona 1992	Atlanta 1996	Sydney 2000

China returned to the Olympic fold in 1984 after a voluntary 32 year absence.

The Power of the Olympic Games for Regimes

China itself had many years previously acknowledged how the presence of the Olympic Games could be used to justify a country's internal or external human rights record. Xinhua Press Agency, one of the official mouthpieces of the Chinese regime reported that the Soviet authorities in 1980 believed that:"the decision to hold the Olympic Games in Moscow has become convincing evidence of the correctness of the foreign policy course of our country". Xinhua commented that: "The Berlin Olympic Games of 1936 were later dismissed as the 'Nazi Olympics', now the Soviet leadership has clearly put its own political stamp on the Games even before they actually begin in Moscow".

As previously described, the then Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing himself made the link between the award of the Games to China at a time of a continued crackdown on Falun Gong as demonstrating that the world agreed with China's behaviour.

The Olympics as a Platform for Ideologies

The Olympic Summer Games provide a platform for worldwide attention, not just for the competing athletes but also for the host country. They have been used as a platform for political ideologies, and as a political football too. Examples include Germany and Japan being barred from taking part in the 1948 Games as a result of World War Two; and the then Soviet Union boycotting the 1996 Atlanta Games in a tit for tat response to the USA's boycott of the Moscow Games in 1980.

Berlin 1936

The Berlin Games of 1936 provided a platform for Nazi Germany that, despite Jesse Owens' amazing performance at the time, associated the Olympics with a political philosophy that was the absolute antithesis of the Olympic ideal. Lord Abderdare, an IOC Member stated that: " the Committee were seriously alarmed at the ill-treatment of the Jews...but decided that they could not be drawn into political and other controversies." (Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings, Pocket Books 1996, pg 35).

Mexico 1968

Mexico City's 1968 Olympic Games were the background to an explosion of violence against demonstrators, who were protesting at the funding of the Games at a time of severe poverty in Mexico. The President, anxious to avoid disruption to the Games, ordered in troops on 2 October 1968, ten days before the Olympics opened. It is estimated that anywhere between 100 and 325 protesters were killed. Thousands were arrested and the massacre shook the country to the core. The IOC had been anxious to avoid any protests from happening. As one IOC member recounted: "Brundage had warned the President, Diaz Ordez, that if there were demonstrations

at the Olympic sites the Games would be cancelled.....the Government strategy in the Square ensured that did not happen." (Jennings, ibid, pg 41).

Moscow 1980

The 1980 Olympics were already highly controversial even before the Games opened, with 60 teams boycotting Moscow in protest at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

The Soviet Union also carried out human rights violations against its own citizens in the run up to the Games. Notable dissidents included Anatoly Scharansky, who was imprisoned in 1978 after he supplied material to the Los Angeles Times, and Alexander Ginzberg, sentenced to hard labour on 13 July 1979 after he had managed a fund for political prisoners. There was no freedom of the press, expression or movement. Dissent was brutally suppressed. It was another six years before the Soviet Union embarked upon democratic reforms.

Seoul 1988

South Korea has often been cited as an example of the power of the Olympic Games to transform a society. However, the reality is far more complex, with IOC commentator Andrew Jennings in particular pointing out that the Olympic organisation seemed far more keen on ensuring stability for the Games than expressing concern for the people of South Korea.

South Korea had been a military dictatorship beset with corruption that, in the run up to the Games in 1988, brutally suppressed mass uprisings in support of democratic reforms. Although there was a change of leadership from General Chun to General Roh in 1988 (who also happened to be the President of the South Korean Organising Committee) this only allowed limited political reform. Political demonstrations were banned throughout the Olympics with 90,000 troops drafted in to enforce it. Seoul was also cleared of all political dissidents, beggars, blind people and alleged criminals.

Appendix Two - IOC's response to ITSN since July 2001

2001:

25 July: Letter to new IOC President and Executive Director outlining concerns, requesting meeting. No response from IOC.

July to October: Phone calls and faxes chasing response.

August: World University Games held in Beijing. IOC President attends and meets with Chinese leaders. States that politics has no place in sport.

November: Meeting with IOC President refused; offer to meet with Hein Verbruggen, Chair of Beijing Coordination Commission and Gilbert Felli.

18 December: Three representatives from International Tibet Support Network (ITSN) meet with Hein Verbruggen and Gilbert Felli at which ITSN outlines concerns. IOC presented with a list of recommendations and promises a response. No response - written or verbal - forthcoming.

2002:

March to May: Three phone calls to IOC requesting response to letter/meeting. Copies of letter sent to all IOC representatives.

April: Rogge and members of the Coordinating Commission make their first visit to Beijing since the 2008 Games were awarded. Rogge interview with BBC's Hard Talk programme

June: Letter to Rogge, again requesting response to recommendations.

Faxed response from Hein Verbruggen received 20 June 2002. No detailed response on the recommendations made by Tibet groups. (see 6)

25 October: Meeting between Free Tibet Campaign and Norwegian Tibet Committee with Jacques Rogge in Lausanne. ITSN's Requests during this meeting, and the IOC's Responses follow:

Request: Access to Host City Contract.

Response: NO

Request: Reveal what human rights clauses are contained within the Host City Contract.

Response: NO

Request: Remove proviso that all political demonstrations or meetings are not allowed in week running up to, during and after the Games.

Response: NO

Request: Appoint human rights advisers into planning process.

Response: NO

Request: How will they ensure media freedom

Response: UNCLEAR

October-December: Numerous requests for copy of tape apparently made of meeting with IOC President in October in Lausanne. No tape forthcoming.

25-29 November: Free Tibet Campaign media work at IOC 113th session in Mexico. IOC debates reform of Olympic Games. No public mention made of human rights in a city which had witnessed the IOC's most public failing in 1968 when protestors were killed for daring to oppose the regime ten days in advance of the Olympic Games in the city.

2003:

Postcard campaigns to IOC President and letter writing by supporters continues. No meetings requested or offered. Copies of Annual Reports sent to IOC Members

2004:

Postcard campaigns to IOC President and letter writing by supporters continues. No meetings requested or offered.

Further Information

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International Tibet Support Network
c/o 28 Charles Square
London N1 6HT
Tel: 020 7324 4615
Fax: 020 7324 4606
Email: itsn@tibet.ca
Web: www.2008-freetibet.org

The International Tibet Support Network is a body of Tibet related non-government organisations with a political mandate. Its purpose is to maximise the effectiveness of the worldwide Tibet movement, which is dedicated to ending human rights violations in Tibet and to actively supporting the Tibetan peoples' right under international law to determine their future political, economic, social, religious and cultural status.

